Privacy-Preserving Filtering for Event Streams by Ny, Jerome Le
1Privacy-Preserving Filtering for Event Streams
Jerome Le Ny, Member, IEEE
Abstract
Many large-scale information systems such as intelligent transportation systems, smart grids or
smart buildings collect data about the activities of their users to optimize their operations. To encourage
participation and adoption of these systems, it is becoming increasingly important that the design
process take privacy issues into consideration. In a typical scenario, signals originate from many sensors
capturing events involving the users, and several statistics of interest need to be continuously published in
real-time. This paper considers the problem of providing differential privacy guarantees for such multi-
input multi-output systems processing event streams. We show how to construct and optimize various
extensions of the zero-forcing equalization mechanism, which we previously proposed for single-input
single-output systems. Some of these extensions can take a model of the input signals into account. We
illustrate our privacy-preserving filter design methodology through the problem of privately monitoring
and forecasting occupancy in a building equipped with multiple motion detection sensors.
Index Terms
Privacy, Filtering, Estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy issues associated with social networking applications or monitoring and decision
systems collecting personal data to operate are receiving an increasing amount of attention [3],
[4]. Indeed, privacy concerns are already resulting in delays or cancellations in the deployment
of some smart power grids, location-based services, or civilian unmanned aerial systems for
example [5]. In order to encourage the adoption of these systems, which can provide important
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2societal benefits, new tools are needed to provide clear privacy protection guarantees and allow
users to balance utility with privacy rigorously [6].
Since offering privacy guarantees for a system generally involves sacrificing some level of
performance, evaluating the resulting trade-offs requires a quantitative definition of privacy.
Various such definitions have been proposed, such as disclosure risk [7] in statistics, k-anonymity
[8], information-theoretic privacy [9], or conditions based on observability [10], [11]. However,
in the last few years the notion of differential privacy has emerged essentially as a standard
specification [12], [13]. Intuitively, a system processing privacy-sensitive inputs from individuals
is differentially private if its published outputs are not too sensitive to the data provided by any
single participant. This definition is naturally linked to the notion of system gain for dynamical
systems, see [14], [15]. One operational advantage of differential privacy compared to other
definitions is that it provides strong guarantees without involving the difficult task of modeling
all the available auxiliary information that could be linked to the published outputs, despite the
fact that unanticipated privacy breaches are typically due to the presence of this side information
[8], [16], [17].
Differential privacy is a strong notion of privacy, but might require large perturbations to
the published results of an analysis in order to hide individuals’ data. This is especially true
for applications where users continuously contribute data over time, and it is thus important to
carefully design real-time mechanisms that can limit the impact on system performance of dif-
ferential privacy requirements. Previous work on designing differentially private mechanisms for
the publication of time series include [18], [19], but these mechanisms are not causal and hence
not suited for real-time applications. The ZFE mechanism of Section IV could also be interpreted
as a dynamic, causal version of the matrix mechanism introduced in [20] for static databases.
The papers [21]–[23] describe real-time differentially private mechanisms to approximate a few
specific filters processing a stream of 0 − 1 variables, representing the occurence of events
attributed to individuals. For example, [21], [22] consider a private accumulator providing at each
time the total number of events that occurred in the past. This paper is inspired by this scenario,
and builds on our previous work on this problem in [14, Section IV] [15, Section VI]. Here
we extend our analysis in particular to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) linear time-invariant
systems, which considerably broadens the applicability of the model to more common situations
where multiple sensors monitor an environment and we wish to concurrently publish several
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3statistics of interest. An application example is that of analyzing spatio-temporal records provided
by networks of simple counting sensors, e.g., motion detectors in buildings or inductive-loop
detectors in traffic information systems [24]. The literature on the differentially private processing
of multi-dimensional time series is still very limited, but includes [25], which considers a single-
input multiple-output filter where each output channel corresponds to a moving average filter
with a different size for the averaging window, as well as [26], which discusses an application
to traffic monitoring.
To summarize, the contributions and organization of this paper are as follows. In Section II,
we present a new generic scenario where we need to approximate a general MIMO linear
time-invariant system by a mechanism offering differential privacy guarantees for the input
signals. The formal definitions necessary to state the problem are also provided in that section.
In Section III we perform some preliminary system sensitivity calculations that are necessary in
the rest of the paper. Section IV presents a general approximation scheme for MIMO systems
that provides differential privacy guarantees for the input signals. The design methodology
and performance of the privacy-preserving filter are illustrated in Section V in the context of
a building occupancy estimation problem. Note that Sections III-V provide a more detailed
presentation of the theoretical and simulation results contained in our conference paper [2].
Finally, Section VI presents additional privacy-preserving mechanisms that can approximate
the desired outputs more closely but require more information about the input signals to be
publicly available, .e.g., their second-order statistics. It improves and extends to the MIMO case
the results presented in our conference paper [1]. This section also illustrates the relationship
between our problem and certain joint Transmitter-Receiver optimization problems arising in the
communication systems literature [27], [28].
Notation: Throughout the paper we use the following standard abbreviations: LTI for Linear
Time-Invariant, SISO for Single-Input Single-Output, SIMO for Single-Input Multiple-Output,
and MIMO for Multiple-Input Multiple-Output. Unless specified otherwise, dynamical systems
or filters are assumed causal, and transfer functions have real-valued coefficients. We fix a base
probability space (Ω,F ,P). For m an integer with m ≥ 1, we write [m] := {1, . . . ,m}. The
notations |x|1 =
∑p
k=1 |xk| and |x|2 = (
∑p
k=1 |xk|2)1/2 are used to denote the 1- and 2-norms in
Rp or Cp, and we reserve the notation ‖·‖ for norms on signal and system spaces. col(x1, . . . xp)
denotes a column vector or signal with components xi, i = 1, . . . , p, and diag(x1, . . . , xm) denotes
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4a diagonal m×m matrix with the xi’s on the diagonal. Finally, for H a Hermitian matrix, H  0
means that it is positive definite, and H  0 that it is positive semi-definite.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Generic Scenario
We consider m sensors detecting events, with sensor i producing a discrete-time scalar signal
{ui,t}t≥0 ∈ R, for i ∈ [m]. In a building monitoring scenario for example, the sensors could be
motion detectors distributed at various locations and polled at regular intervals, with ui,t ∈ N the
number of detected events reported for period t. We denote u the resulting vector-valued signal,
i.e., ut ∈ Rm. A linear time-invariant (LTI) filter F , with m inputs and p outputs, takes input
signals u from the sensors and publishes output signals y = Fu of interest, with yt ∈ Rp. In our
example, we might be interested in continuously updating real-time estimates of the number of
people in various parts of the building, as well as short- and medium-term occupancy forecasts,
in order to optimize the operations of the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system. The problem considered in this paper consists in replacing the filter F by a system
processing the input u and producing a signal yˆ as close as possible to the desired output y
(minimizing for example the mean squared error limT→∞ 1T
∑∞
t=0 E[|yt− yˆt|22]), while providing
some privacy guarantees to the individuals from which the input signals u originate. The privacy
constraint is explained and quantified in the next subsection.
B. Differential Privacy
As mentioned in the introduction, a differentially private mechanism publishes data in a way
that is not too sensitive to the presence or absence of a single individual. A formal definition
of differential privacy is provided in Definition 1 below. In the previous building monitoring
example, one goal of a privacy constraint could be to provide guarantees that an individual
cannot be tracked too precisely from the published (typically aggregate) data. Indeed, Wilson
and Atkeson [29] for example demonstrate how to track individual users in a building using a
network of simple binary sensors such as motion detectors.
1) Adjacency Relation: Formally, we start by defining a symmetric binary relation, denoted
Adj, on the space D of datasets of interest, which captures what it means for two datasets to
differ by the data of a single individual. Essentially, it is hard to determine from a differentially
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5private output which of any two adjacent input datasets was used. Here, D := {u : N 7→ Rm}
is the set of input signals, and we have Adj(u, u′) if and only if we can obtain the signal u′
from u by adding or subtracting the events corresponding to just one user. Motivated again by
applications to spatial monitoring, we consider in this paper the following adjacency relation
Adj(u, u′) iff ∀i ∈ [m],∃ti ∈ N, αi ∈ R, s.t. u′i − ui = αiδti , |αi| ≤ ki, (1)
parametrized by a vector k ∈ Rm with components ki > 0. According to (1), a single individual
can affect each input signal component at a single time (here δti denotes the discrete impulse
signal with impulse at ti), and by at most ki. Let ei ∈ Rm be the ith basis vector, i.e., with
coordinates eij = δij, j = 1, . . . ,m. Then for two adjacent signals u, u′, we have with the
notation in (1)
u′ − u =
m∑
i=1
αiδtiei. (2)
Note in passing that we can place additional constraints on k to capture additional knowledge
about the problem, which can help design mechanisms with better performance, as we discuss
later. For example, if we known that a given person can activate at most l < m sensor and each
ki is 1, we can add the constraint |k|1 ≤ l.
The adjacency relation (1) extends the one considered in [15], [21], [22] to the case of multiple
input signals. It puts two constraints on the influence that an individual can have on the input data
in order for a differentially private mechanism to offer him guarantees. First, any given sensor can
report an event due to the presence of the individual only once over the time interval of interest
for our analysis. This is a sensible constraint in applications such as traffic monitoring with fixed
motion detectors activated only once by each car traveling along a road, certain location-based
services where a customer would check-in say at most once per day at each visited store, or
certain health-monitoring applications where an individual would report a sickness only once.
For a building monitoring scenario however, a single user could trigger the same motion detector
several times over a relatively short period. A first solution consists in splitting the data stream
of problematic sensors into several successive intervals, each considered as the signal from a
new virtual sensor, so that an individual’s data is present only once in each interval. A MIMO
mechanism can then process such data and offer guarantees, addressing one of the main issues for
the applicability of the model proposed in [21], [22]. However, increasing the number of inputs
degrades the privacy guarantees or the output quality that we can provide. Hence in general
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6no privacy guarantee will be offered to users who activate the same sensor too frequently. The
second constraint imposed by (1) is that we bound the magnitude of an individual’s contribution
by ki, but this is not really problematic in applications such as motion detection, where we can
typically take ki = 1.
2) Definition of Differential Privacy: Mechanisms that are differentially private necessarily
randomize their outputs, in such a way that they satisfy the following property [12], [13], [30].
Definition 1. Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let
(R,M) be a measurable space. Let , δ ≥ 0. A mechanism M : D×Ω→ R is (, δ)-differentially
private for Adj (and M) if for all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′), we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈M. (3)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
This definition quantifies the allowed deviation for the output distribution of a differentially
private mechanism for two adjacent datasets d and d′. One can also show that it is impossible to
design a statistical test with small error to decide if d or d′ was used by a differentially private
mechanism to produce its output [31], [32]. In this paper, the space D was defined as the space
of input signals, and the adjacency relation considered is (1). The output space R is simply
the space of output signals R := {y : N → Rp}. Finally, a differentially private mechanism
will consist of a system approximating our MIMO filter of interest F , as well as a source of
noise necessary to randomize the outputs and satisfy (1). We also refer the reader to [14] for
a technical discussion on the (standard) σ-algebra M used on the output signal space to offer
useful guarantees.
3) Sensitivity: Enforcing differential privacy can be done by randomly perturbing the pub-
lished output of a system, at the price of reducing its utility or quality. Hence, we are interested
in evaluating as precisely as possible the amount of noise necessary to make a mechanism
differentially private. For this purpose, the following quantity plays an important role.
Definition 2. The `2-sensitivity of a system G with m inputs and p outputs with respect to the
adjacency relation Adj is defined by
∆m,p2 G = sup
Adj(u,u’)
‖Gu−Gu′‖2 = sup
Adj(u,u’)
‖G(u− u′)‖2,
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7where by definition ‖Gv‖2 =
√∑∞
t=−∞ |(Gv)t|22.
4) A Basic Differentially Private Mechanism: The basic mechanism of Theorem 1 below (see
[15]), extending [30], can be used to answer queries in a differentially private way. To present
the result, we recall first the definition of the Q-function Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−
u2
2 du. Now for
, δ > 0, let K = Q−1(δ) and define κδ, = 12(K +
√
K2 + 2).
Theorem 1. Let G be a system with m inputs and p outputs, and with `2-sensitivity ∆m,p2 G with
respect to an adjacency relation Adj. Then the mechanism M(u) = Gu + w, where w is a p-
dimensional Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix κ2δ,(∆
m,p
2 G)
2Ip is (, δ)-differentially
private with respect to Adj.
The mechanism M described in Theorem 1, which is a differentially-private version of a
system G, is called an output-perturbation mechanism. We see that the amount of noise sufficient
for differential privacy with this mechanism is proportional to the `2-sensitivity of the filter and
to κδ,, which can be shown to behave roughly as O(ln(1/δ))1/2/. Note that we add noise
proportional to the sensitivity of the whole filter G independently on each output, even if G was
diagonal say, otherwise trivial attacks that simply average a sufficient number of outputs could
potentially detect the presence of an individual with high probability [15].
In conclusion we could obtain a differentially private mechanism for our original problem by
simply adding a sufficient amount of noise to the output of our desired filter F , provided we
can compute its sensitivity, which is the topic of the next section. Moreover, it is possible in
general to design mechanisms with much less overall noise than this output-perturbation scheme,
as discussed in Sections IV and VI.
III. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS
For the following sensitivity calculations (see Definition 2), the H2 norm of an LTI system
plays an important role. We recall its definition for a system G with m inputs
‖G‖22 =
m∑
i=1
‖Gδ0ei‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G∗(ejω)G(ejω))dω.
Writing G(z) = [Gij(z)]i,j for the p×m transfer matrix, we also note from the frequency domain
definition that ‖G‖22 =
∑
i,j ‖Gij‖22.
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8A. Exact solutions for the SIMO and Diagonal Cases
Generalizing the SISO scenario considered in [14], [15] to the case of a SIMO system, we
have immediately the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (SIMO LTI system). Let G be a stable LTI system with one input and p outputs.
For the adjacency relation (1), we have ∆1,p2 G = k1‖G‖2, where ‖G‖2 is the H2 norm of G.
Proof: We have immediately for u and u′ adjacent
‖G(u− u′)‖22 = |α1|2‖Gδt1‖22 ≤ k21‖G‖22,
and the bound is attained if |α1| = k1.
For a system G with multiple inputs, the special case where G is diagonal, i.e., its transfer
matrix is G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . , Gmm(z)), also leads to a simple sensitivity result. Note that
in this case, we have ‖G‖22 =
∑m
i=1 ‖Gii‖2.
Theorem 3 (Diagonal LTI system). Let G be a stable diagonal LTI system with m inputs and
outputs. For the adjacency relation (1), denoting K = diag(k1, . . . , km), we have
∆m,m2 G = ‖GK‖2 =
(
m∑
i=1
‖kiGii‖22
)1/2
.
Proof: If G is diagonal, then for u and u’ adjacent, we have from (2)
‖G(u− u′)‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αiGδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= ‖col(α1g11 ∗ δt1 , . . . , αmgmm ∗ δtm)‖22,
where gii denotes the impulse response of Gii. Hence
‖G(u− u′)‖22 =
m∑
i=1
‖αigii ∗ δti‖22 =
m∑
i=1
|αi|2‖Gii‖22,
and |αi| ≤ ki, for all i. Again the bound is attained if |αi| = ki for all i.
B. Upper and Lower Bound for the general MIMO Case
For MISO or general MIMO systems, the sensitivity calculations are no longer so straightfor-
ward, because the impulses on the various input channels, obtained from the difference of two
adjacent signals u, u′, all possibly influence any given output. Still, the following result provides
simple bounds on the sensitivity.
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9Theorem 4. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs. For the adjacency
relation (1), denoting K = diag(k1, . . . , km), and |k|2 = (
∑m
i=1 k
2
i )
1/2, we have
‖GK‖2 ≤ ∆m,p2 G ≤ |k|2‖G‖2. (4)
Proof: We have G(u − u′) = ∑mi=1 αiGδtiei, and moreover ‖G‖22 = ∑mi=1 ‖Gδtiei‖22 by
definition. For the upper bound, we can write
‖G(u− u′)‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αiGδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
m∑
i=1
|αi|‖Gδtiei‖2
≤ |k|2
(
m∑
i=1
‖Gδtiei‖22
)1/2
,
where the last inequality results from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
For the lower bound, let us first take u′ ≡ 0. Then consider an adjacent signal u with a
single discrete impulse of height ki at time ti on each input channel i, for i = 1, . . . ,m, with
t1 < t2 < . . . < tm. Let η > 0. Denote the “columns” of G as Gi for i = 1, . . . ,m, i.e.,
Gu =
∑m
i=1Giui. Since ‖G‖2 <∞, ‖Giui‖2 <∞, and hence |(Giui)t| → 0 as t→∞. Hence
by taking ti+1 − ti large enough for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, i.e., waiting for the effect of impulse
i on the output to be sufficiently small, we can choose the signal u such that
‖Gu‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
Giui
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≥
m∑
i=1
k2i ‖Gδtiei‖22 − η.
Since this is true for any η > 0 and ‖Gδtiei‖22 = ‖Gi‖22, we get (∆m,p2 G)2 ≥ ‖GK‖22 =∑m
i=1 k
2
i ‖Gi‖2.
Note that if k1 = . . . = km, the upper bound on the sensitivity is k1‖G‖2
√
m. We can compare
this bound to the situation where G is diagonal, in which case the sensitivity is exactly k1‖G‖2
from Theorem 3. The following example shows that the upper bound of Theorem 4 cannot be
improved for the general MISO or MIMO case.
Example 1. Consider the MISO system G(z) = [G11(z), . . . , G1m(z)], with g1i = δτi the impulse
response of G1i, for some times τ1, . . . , τm. Then ‖G‖22 = m. Now let u′ ≡ 0 and u =
∑m
i=1 δtiei,
so that u and u′ are adjacent, with k1 = . . . = km = 1, and moreover let us choose the
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times ti such that τi + ti is a constant, i.e., take ti = κ − τi for some κ ≥ maxi{τi}. Then
Gu =
∑m
i=1 g1i ∗ ui = mδκ, and so ‖Gu‖22 = m2. This shows that the upper bound of Theorem
4 is tight in this case. Note that this happens because all the events of the signal u influence the
output at the same time. Indeed, if the times τi + ti are all distinct, then we get ‖Gu‖22 = m.
C. Exact solution for the MIMO Case
For completeness, we give in this subsection an exact expression for the sensitivity of a MIMO
filter. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space representation
xt+1 = Axt +But (5)
yt = Cxt +Dut,
with x0 = 0. Recall the definition of the observability Gramian P0, which is the unique positive
semi-definite solution of the equation
ATP0A− P0 + CTC = 0.
Let Bi, Di be the ith column of the matrix B and D respectively, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Finally,
define for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i 6= j, and τ in Z
Sτij =

DTj CA
τ−1Bi +BTj P0A
τBi, if τ > 0
DTi Dj +B
T
i P0Bj, if τ = 0
DTi CA
|τ |−1Bj +BTi P0A
|τ |Bj, if τ < 0.
(6)
Theorem 5. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space
representation (5). Then, for the adjacency relation (1), we have
(∆m,p2 G)
2 = ‖GK‖22 +
m∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
kikj
(
sup
ti,tj∈N
∣∣∣Stj−tiij ∣∣∣
)
. (7)
Proof: In view of (2), we have
∆m,p2 G = sup
|αi|≤ki,ti≥0
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αiGδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
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For yi = Gδtiei and y =
∑m
i=1 αiyi, we have
‖y‖22 =
∞∑
t=0
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
αiyi,t
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
α2i |yi,t|2 +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
αiαjy
T
i,tyj,t
≤ ‖GK‖22 +
m∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
kikj
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=0
yTi,tyj,t
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where K = diag(k1, . . . , km) and the bound can be attained by taking αi ∈ {−ki, ki}, depending
on the sign of Sij :=
∑∞
t=0 y
T
i,tyj,t.
Next, we derive the more explicit expression for Sij given in the theorem. First,
yi,t =

0, t < ti,
Di, t = ti
CAt−ti−1Bi, t > ti.
Then if ti = tj , we find that
Sij = D
T
i Dj +B
T
i P0Bj,
with P0 =
∑∞
t=0(A
t)TCTCAt the observability Gramian. If ti < tj , then
Sij = B
T
i (A
tj−ti−1)TCTDj +BTi (A
tj−ti)TP0Bj,
which corresponds to the first case in (6). The case ti > tj is symmetric.
D. Discussion
In (7), the maximization over inter-event times ti− tj still needs to be performed and depends
on the parameters of the specific system G. This result could be used to evaluate carefully the
amount of noise necessary in an output perturbation mechanism, but unfortunately it seems too
unwieldy at this point to be used in more advanced mechanism optimization schemes, such as
the ones discussed in the next sections.
Still, the expression (7) provides some intuition about the way the system dynamics influence
its sensitivity. In particular, the second term in (7) can give insight into the gap between the
sensitivity and the lower bound in (4). Note from the expression of Sτij in (6) that one way to
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Fig. 1. Approximation setup for differentially private filtering. The signal w is a noise signal guaranteeing that v is a differentially
private signal. The signal yˆ is differentially private no matter what the system H is, see [15, Theorem 1].
decrease the sensitivity of G is to increase sufficiently the required time |ti − tj| between the
events contributed by a single user, in order for ‖A|ti−tj |‖ to be small enough. Hence, a lower
bound on inter-event times in different streams could be introduced in the adjacency relation
to reduce a system’s sensitivity. This would weaken the differential privacy guarantee but help
in the design of mechanisms with better performance. Another possibility would be to have
a privacy-preserving mechanism simply ignore events from a given user as long as the lower
bound on inter-event times is not reached.
IV. ZERO-FORCING MIMO MECHANISMS
Using the sensitivity calculations of Section III, we can now design differentially private
mechanisms to approximate a given filter F , as discussed in Section II-A. The mechanisms
described in this section generalize to the MIMO case some ideas introduced in [14]. The
general approximation architecture considered is described on Fig. 1. On this figure, the system
H is of the form H = FL, with L a left inverse of the pre-filter G. We call the resulting
mechanisms Zero-Forcing Equalization (ZFE) mechanisms. Our goal is to design G (and hence,
H) so that the Mean Square Error (MSE) between y and yˆ on Fig. 1 is minimized. In order
to obtain a differentially private signal v, we introduce a Gaussian white noise signal w with
variance proportional to the sensitivity of the filter G. It was shown in [14] for the SISO case that
this setup can allow significant performance improvements compared to the output-perturbation
mechanism. Note that the latter is recovered when G = F and H is the identity.
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A. SIMO system approximation
First, let us assume that F on Fig. 1 is a SIMO filter, with p outputs. Consider a first stage
G(z) = col(G1(z), . . . , Gq(z)) taking the input signal u and producing q intermediate outputs
that must be perturbed. The second stage is taken to be H = FL, with L(z) = [L1(z), . . . , Lq(z)]
a left-inverse of G, i.e., satisfying
q∑
i=1
Li(z)Gi(z) = 1.
Let us also define the transfer functions Mi, i = 1, . . . , q, such that Mi(z) = Li(z−1), hence
Mi(e
jω) = Li(e
jω)∗, and thus in particular
|Mi(ejω)|2 = |Li(ejω)|2, i = 1, . . . , q, (8)
and
q∑
i=1
Mi(e
jω)∗Gi(ejω) = 1. (9)
From Theorem 2, the sensitivity of the first stage for input signals that are adjacent according
to (1) is k1‖G‖2. Hence, according to Theorem 1, adding a white Gaussian noise w to the output
of G with covariance matrix k21κ
2
δ,‖G‖22Iq is sufficient to ensure that the signal v on Fig. 1 is
differentially private. The MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
eZFEmse (G) = lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E
[|(Fu)t − (FLGu)t − (FLw)t|22]
eZFEmse (G) = lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E
[|(FLw)t|22]
eZFEmse (G) = k
2
1κ
2
δ,‖G‖22‖FL‖22.
We are thus led to consider the minimization of ‖FL‖22‖G‖22 over the pre-filters G. We have
‖FL‖22‖G‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(L∗(ejω)F ∗(ejω)F (ejω)L(ejω))dω × 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G∗(ejω)G(ejω))dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|22 |L(ejω)|22dω ×
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|22dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|22 |M(ejω)|22dω ×
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|22dω,
where in the last equality we used (8). Now consider the following inner product on the space
of 2pi-periodic functions with values in Cq
〈f, g〉 = 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
f(ejω)∗g(ejω)dω.
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By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for this inner product applied to the functions ω 7→ |F (ejω)|2M(ejω)
and ω 7→ G(ejω), we obtain the following bound
‖FL‖22‖G‖22 ≥
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|2
q∑
i=1
M∗i (e
jω)Gi(e
jω)dω
)2
,
i.e., using (9),
‖FL‖22‖G‖22 ≥
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|2 dω
)2
.
Moreover, the two sides in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality are equal, i.e., the bound is attained,
if
|F (ejω)|2M(ejω) = G(ejω).
Note that this condition does not depend on q. Hence we can simply take q = 1, and L(z) =
1/G(z), to get
|F (ejω)|2 L∗(ejω) = G(ejω)
i.e., |G(ejω)|2 = |F (ejω)|2. (10)
Finding G SISO satisfying (10) is a spectral factorization problem. We can choose G stable
and minimum phase, so that its inverse L is also stable. The following theorem summarizes the
preceding discussion and generalizes [15, Theorem 8].
Theorem 6. Let F be a SIMO LTI system with ‖F‖2 <∞. For any stable LTI system G,
eZFEmse (G) ≥ k21κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|2 dω
)2
. (11)
If moreover F satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi ln |F (ejω)|2 dω > −∞, this lower
bound on the mean square error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained by some stable minimum
phase SISO system G such that |G(ejω)|2 = |F (ejω)|2, for almost every ω ∈ [−pi, pi).
Proof: The main argument for the proof was given before the theorem. Since |F (ejω)|2 is
a nonnegative function on the unit circle, if it satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition, it has indeed
a minimum phase spectral factor G satisfying (10) almost everywhere [33, p. 242].
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Fig. 2. (Suboptimal) ZFE mechanism for a MIMO system Fu =
∑m
i=1 Fiui, and a diagonal pre-filter G(z) =
diag(G11(z), . . . , Gmm(z)). Here Fi(z) is a p × 1 transfer matrix, for i = 1, . . . ,m. The signal w is a white Gaussian
noise with covariance matrix κ2δ,‖KG‖22Im.
B. MIMO system approximation
Let us now assume that F has m > 1 inputs. We write F (z) = [F1(z), . . . , Fm(z)], with Fi a
p×1 transfer matrix. In this case, in view of the complicated expression (7) for the sensitivity of a
general MIMO filter, we only provide a subpotimal ZFE mechanism, together with a comparison
between the performance of our mechanism and the optimal ZFE mechanism. The idea is to
restrict our attention to pre-filters G that are m ×m and diagonal, for which the sensitivity is
given in Theorem 3. The problem of optimizing the diagonal pre-filters, using the architecture
depicted on Fig. 2, can in fact be seen as designing m SIMO mechanisms.
1) Diagonal Pre-filter Optimization: If G is diagonal, then according to Theorem 3 its squared
sensitivity is (∆m,m2 G)
2 = ‖KG‖22 =
∑m
i=1 ‖kiGii‖22, with K = diag(k1, . . . , km). Following the
same reasoning as in the previous subsection, the MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
eZFEmse (G) = κ
2
δ,‖KG‖22‖FG−1‖22, (12)
with G−1(z) = diag(G11(z)−1, . . . , Gmm(z)−1). Now remark that
‖FG−1‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
|Fi(ejω)|22
|Gii(ejω)|2dω.
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Hence from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again, we obtain the lower bound
eZFEmse (G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
|Fi(ejω)|2
|Gii(ejω)| |kiGii(e
jω)|dω
)2
eZFEmse (G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
ki|Fi(ejω)|2 dω
)2
,
and this bound is attained if
ki|Gii(ejω)| = |Fi(e
jω)|2
|Gii(ejω)| ,
i.e. ki|Gii(ejω)|2 = |Fi(ejω)|2, i = 1, . . . ,m.
In other words, the best diagonal pre-filter for the MIMO ZFE mechanism can be obtained from
m spectral factorizations of the functions ω 7→ 1
ki
|Fi(ejω)|2, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Theorem 7. Let F = [F1, . . . , Fm] be a MIMO LTI system with ‖F‖2 < ∞. We have, for any
stable diagonal filter G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . , Gmm(z)),
eZFEmse (G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
ki|Fi(ejω)|2 dω
)2
. (13)
If moreover each Fi satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition 12pi
∫ pi
−pi ln |Fi(ejω)|2 dω > −∞, this
lower bound on the mean-squared error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained by some stable
minimum phase systems Gii such that |Gii(ejω)|2 = 1ki |Fi(ejω)|2, for almost every ω ∈ [−pi, pi).
Remark 1. Note that the integrand on the right-hand side of (14) can be written
m∑
i=1
ki|Fi(ejω)|2 := ‖F (ejω)K‖2,1,
where K = diag(k1, . . . , km) as usual and ‖ · ‖2,1 is the so-called L2,1 or R1 matrix norm, and
appears in [34] for example.
2) Comparison with Non-Diagonal Pre-filters: For F a general MIMO system, it is possible
that we could achieve a better performance with a ZFE mechanism where G is not diagonal,
i.e., by combining the inputs before adding the privacy-preserving noise. To provide a better
understanding of how much could potentially be gained by carrying out this more involved
optimization over general pre-filters G rather than just diagonal pre-filters, the following Theorem
provides a a lower bound on the MSE achievable by any ZFE mechanism.
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Theorem 8. Let F = [F1, . . . , Fm] be a MIMO LTI system with ‖F‖2 < ∞. We have, for any
m×m stable filter G(z), with left inverse L so that L(z)G(z) = I ,
eZFEmse (G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
‖F (ejω)K‖∗dω
)2
, (14)
where ‖F (ejω)K‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F (ejω)K (sum of singular values).
The lower bound (15) on the achievable MSE with a general pre-filter in a ZFE mechanism
should be compared to the performance (14) that can actually be achieved with diagonal pre-
filters. Note that these bounds coı¨ncide for m = 1. For m > 1, the gap depends on the difference
between the integrals of the L2,1 norm and the nuclear norm of F (ejω)K.
Proof: We denote as usual K = diag(k1, . . . , km), and define G˜ = GK and L˜ = K−1L,
so that we again have L˜G˜ = I . Let F˜ = FK. With the lower bound of Theorem 4, designing
a ZFE mechanism based on sensitivity as above would require adding a noise with variance at
least κ2δ,‖G˜‖22. This would lead to an MSE at least equal to κ2δ,‖G˜‖22‖F˜ L˜‖22. Now note that
‖F˜ L˜‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(F˜ (ejω)L˜(ejω)L˜(ejω)∗F˜ (ejω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(F˜ (ejω)∗F˜ (ejω)L˜(ejω)L˜(ejω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(ejω)2L˜(ejω)L˜(ejω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(ejω)L˜(ejω)L˜(ejω)∗A(ejω))dω,
where for all ω, A(ejω) is the unique Hermitian positive-semidefinite square root of F˜ (ejω)∗F˜ (ejω),
i.e., A(ejω)2 = F˜ (ejω)∗F˜ (ejω). Then, once again from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, now for
the inner product 〈M,N〉 = 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi Tr(M(e
jω)∗N(ejω))dω,
‖GK‖22 ‖FL‖22 = ‖G˜‖22‖F˜ L˜‖22 =
[
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω))dω
]
×
[
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(ejω)L˜(ejω)L˜(ejω)∗A(ejω))dω
]
≥
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(ejω)L˜(ejω)G˜(ejω))dω
)2
and so eZFEmse (G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
‖F (ejω)K‖∗dω
)2
, (15)
where ‖F (ejω)K‖∗ = Tr(A(ejω)) denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F (ejω)K.
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Figure 3: The floor plan of the experimental area. O ces are mostly on the
outside of the building. The areas observed by sensors (shaded) are hallways,
lobbies, and meeting rooms.
0118.txt.gz May 24 05:46:40 2007 – Jul 2 15:41:50 2007
The filename refers to the high-order bits of the timestamps on the data
contained in each file.
The files contain data like this:
470 01179980510828 01179980511853 1.0
469 01179980512169 01179980513193 1.0
467 01179980513580 01179980514609 1.0
468 01179980514573 01179980515598 1.0
The first element is the sensor identification number. The second and third
numbers are the timestamps of the beginning of the event. The fourth number
is a meaningless place holder value.
The map in Figure 3 depicts the test area. Executives and administrators
occupy the wing on the right right side of the eighth floor map. Researchers
occupy the bottom and left wings, and most of the 7th floor. The central core
of the building contains restrooms, lobbies, elevators, and on the eighth floor,
the mail room and the kitchen. There are several stairwells that connect the
floors.
We have been collecting data at this facility since October of 2005. Data
from the entire area depicted on that map has been continuously recorded since
March 2006. The system generates approximately two million motion detections
per month.
MERL-TR2007-069 November 2007
a) b) c)
Fig. 9. Selected frames of the videos from the clip bin. The clips demonstrate automatic handover and tracking mechanisms.
Fig. 10. Example of crowd movement during a fire drill.
dataset is interesting because it contains significant structures that exist
across these visualizations. As people move through the building they
create a spatio-temporal trace of motion activations. When they pass
by or interact with other individuals their traces become tangled into
a spatio-temporal graph of possibilities. In this section we show how
the use of these graphs helps an operator quickly untangle these trace
rel tionships and find all video- and sensor-based evidence relating to
a individual occupant of the space.
6.1 Human-guided tracking
In this section we present the principles and challenges of information
visualization used in the tracking module of our system. The technical
background of track composition and analysis technique that we use
here can be found in our earlier paper [6].
Due to the impoverished nature of the motion sensors, it is not pos-
sible to una biguously track ndividuals through a building if they
cross paths or otherwise interact with other individuals in the space. A
massive crowd would generate an overwhelming mass of ambiguity,
such as during a fire evacuation as depicted in Figure 10. However,
the much more common case is that each individual interacts with a
few others to create webs of ambiguity, such as those represented by
the graph in Figure 11.
These graphs are constructed from nodes of ambiguity connected
by unambiguous spatio-temporal traces called tracklets. The tracklets
are depicted on the map as distinct lines tracing an unambiguous path
through the space, as seen in Figure 13. At any moment there may be
multiple tracklets under consideration: a series of selected tracks and
several possible future continuations. These tracklets are distinguished
from one another in several ways. First, each tracklet is coded with a
unique color. Second, as is apparent in Figure 13, the tracklets are as-
signed spatially distinct channels on the map to reduce the possibility
of overlap and improve the intelligibility of the display.
Finally, although tracklets may traverse a common space with other
tracklets, they may do so in different directions and different times.
Start
Join
Split
End
Fig. 11. Tracklet graph representation of the track bundle. Each edge,
called a Tracklet, represents a contiguous sequence of sensor activa-
tions, while nodes represent ambiguities and endpoints.
Fig. 13. Tracklet display. In order to achieve the pre-attentive assess-
ment of the multitude of tracks and direction of motion we chose an
asymmetric swell as a direction cue.
This temporal component is shown with an asymmetric swell that
communicates both the direction and the current location of the in-
dividual. In Figure 13 we see that that the orange tracklet is active and
the person is moving toward the right, while the blue and cyan tracks
are currently not active.
As above, control over the temporal aspect of the visualization oc-
curs in the timeline window. Scrubbing the time marker over the time-
line simultaneously animates the swell of the tracklets on the map.
This provides a very fluid mechanism of interaction with various track-
lets over time.
The forensic surveillance system shown in Figure 14 allows the op-
erator to build a story about the movements of a particular individual,
presumably in response to an alarm or other event. In order to recover
an unambiguous track of a particular person, the human has to tra-
verse the graph and resolve all the ambiguities, selecting the correct
continuation at each node.
The system supports this task by helping the operator navigate
through space and time to quickly inspect each ambiguity, providing
Fig. 3. Left: plan of one of the two floors in the MERL building used for the sensor network experiment [35]. The shaded
areas are hallways, lobbies and meeting rooms equipped with binary motion detection sensors, placed a few meters apart and
recording events roughly every second. Right: a figure taken from [36] shows a visualisation of a crowd movement during a
fire drill.
V. APPLICATION TO PRIVACY-PRESERVING ESTIMATION OF BUILDING OCCUPANCY
In this section we illustrate the design process and the performance of the ZFE mechanism
in the context of an application to filtering and forecasting occupancy-related events in an office
building equipped with motion detection sensors. As mentioned in Section II-B, such sensor
networks raise privacy concerns since some occupants could potentially be tracked individually
from the published information, especially when it is corr lated with public information such
as the location of their office. Since the amount of private information leakage depends on the
output signals the system aims to generates, we djust the privacy-preserving noise level based
on the filter specification using the ZFE m chanism. As an ex mple, we simulate the outputs
of a 3× 15 MIMO filter proces ing input signals collecte duri g a sensor network experiment
carried out at the Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (MERL) and described in [35] and
on Fig. 3. We refer the reader to [36] for examples of identific tion of in ividual trajectories
from this dataset.
The original dataset contains t t ces of 213 sensors placed a few meters apart and spread
over two floors of a building, where each sensor recorded roughly every second and with
millisecond accuracy over a year the exact times at which they detected some motion. F r
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illustration purposes we downsampled the dataset in space and time, summing all the events
recorded by several sufficiently close sensors over 3 minute intervals. From this step, we obtained
15 input signals ui, i = 1, . . . , 15, corresponding to 15 spatial zones (each zone covered by cluster
of about 14 sensors), with a discrete-time period corresponding to 3 minutes, and ui,t being the
number of events detected by all the sensors in zone i during period t. Let us assume say that
during a given discrete-time period, a single individual can activate at most 4 sensors in any
group, hence ki = 4 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 15. Moreover, we need to assume that a single individual only
activates the sensors in a given zone once over the time interval for which we wish to provide
differential privacy. Section II-B discussed how to relax this requirement by splitting the input
data into successive time windows and creating additional input channels.
For our example, we consider computing simultaneously and in real-time the following three
outputs from the 15 input signals
y1
y2
y3
 =

f1(z)11×5 01×10
01×4 f2(z)11×8 01×3
f3(z)
u, (16)
where
• y1 is the sum of the simple moving averages over the past 60 min for zones 1 to 5, i.e.,
f1(z) =
1
20
∑20
k=1 z
−k,
• y2 is
∑12
i=5 f2ui, with f2 a finite impulse response low-pass filter with Gaussian shaped im-
pulse response of length 20, obtained using Matlab’s function gaussdesign(0.5,2,10).
• y3 is the scalar output of a 1× 15 MISO filter f3 designed to forecast at each period t the
average total number of events per time-period that will occur in the whole building during
the window [t+ 60 min, t+ 90 min]. This filter was constructed by identifying an ARMAX
model [37] between the 15 inputs (plus a scalar white noise) and the desired outputs, with
the calibration done using one part of the dataset. The model chosen is takes the form
y3,t =
4∑
i=1
aiy3,t−i + b0ut + b1ut−2 + c1et,
where a1, . . . , a4 and b0, b1 are scalar and row vectors respectively forming the filter f3, c1
is a scalar and et is a zero-mean white noise input postulated by the ARMAX model for
system identification purposes.
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Fig. 4. Sample-paths over 72 hours (the sampling period is 3 min) for the outputs 2 and 3 of our differentially private
approximation of filter (16), shown together with the desired outputs. The privacy-related parameters are  = ln 5, δ = 0.05, ki =
4 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 15.
Fig. 4 shows sample paths over a 72h period of the 2nd and 3rd outputs of the desired filter
and of its (ln 5, 0.05)-differentially private approximation obtained using the ZFE mechanism.
The 15 optimal pre-filters were obtained approximately via least-squares fit of
√|Fi(ejω)|2 with
negligible approximation error (Matlab’s function yulewalk implementing the Yule-Walker
method [38]), rather than true spectral factorization mentioned in Theorem 7. One apparent
aspect of the privacy-preserving outputs seen on Fig. 4 is that the noise level is independent of
the size of the desired output signal, hence low signal values tend to be easily buried in the noise.
This is one drawback of mechanisms relying on global sensitivity measures and additive noise.
Another noticeable element is the fact that the noise remaining on each output can have quite
different characteristics depending on the desired filter F , with the post-filter FG−1 removing
more high-frequency components on the second output than on the third.
VI. EXPLOITING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE INPUT SIGNALS
The main issue with SISO zero-forcing equalizers is the noise amplification at frequencies
where |G(ejω)| is small, due to the inversion in H = FG−1 [39]. This issue is not as problematic
July 18, 2018 DRAFT
21
for the optimal ZFE mechanism, since in this case the amplification is compensated by the
fact that |F (ejω)| and |G(ejω)| given in Theorem 7 are both small at the same frequencies.
Nonetheless, we expect to be able to improve on the ZFE mechanism by using more advanced
equalization schemes in the design of H . In this section the choice of post-filter H of Fig. 1
depends on certain input signal properties, and we concentrate on the optimization of diagonal
pre-filters G as for the ZFE mechanism. Note however that the mechanisms below require that the
input signals satisfy certain constraints, such as wide-sense stationarity, and that some publicly
available information on these signals be available, e.g., their second order statistics. Hence, the
ZFE mechanism remains generally useful due to its broad applicability.
A. Exploiting Information on Second-Order Statistics with Linear Mean Square Mechanisms
First, one can improve on the ZFE mechanism if some information on the statistics of the
input signal u is publicly available. In general, constructing the optimum maximum-likelihood
estimate of {(Fu)k}k≥0 from {vk}k≥0 on Fig. 1 is computationally intensive and requires the
knowledge of the full joint probability distribution of {uk}k≥0 [39]. Hence, we explore in this
subsection a simpler scheme based on linear minimum mean square error estimation, which we
call the Linear Mean Square (LMS) mechanism.
To develop the LMS mechanism, we assume that it is publicly known that u is wide-sense
stationary (WSS) with know mean vector µ and matrix-valued autocorrelation sequence Ru[k] =
E[utuTt−k] = Ru[−k]T ,∀k. Since the mean of the output y is then known, equal to F (1)µ, we can
assume without loss of generality that µ = 0. The z-spectrum of u, Pu(z) =
∑∞
k=−∞Ru[k]z
−k, is
assumed for simplicity of exposition to be rational and positive definite on the unit circle, i.e., for
z = ejω. More generally, given two vector-valued WSS zero-mean signals u and v, we denote the
cross-correlation matrix Ruv[k] = E[utvTt−k], the cross z-spectrum Puv(z) =
∑∞
k=−∞Ruv[k]z
−k,
and all z-spectra are assumed to be rational.
The design of the LMS mechanism relies on a Wiener filter H to estimate y from v on Fig. 1
[33], [40]. Recall that the Wiener filter produces an estimate yˆ minimizing the MSE between y
and yˆ over linear filters, assuming that the signal v is stationary. Its design requires the knowledge
of the second-order statistics of v, which can be expressed in terms of those of u, w, and of
the transfer function G. Our design procedure involves the following steps. First, for tractability
reasons, we assume initially that H is an infinite impulse response (IIR) Wiener smoother, i.e.,
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non-causal. The reason is that we can then express the estimation performance analytically as a
function of G. We then optimize this performance measure over diagonal pre-filters G. Once G
is fixed, real-time considerations force us to use a lower-performance design with H a causal
Wiener filter, or perhaps a slightly non-causal filter introducing a small delay is tolerable for a
specific application.
1) Diagonal Pre-Filter Optimization: The (non-causal) Wiener smoother H has the transfer
function H(z) = Pyv(z)Pv(z)−1 [40, Section 7.8]. According to Theorem 3, for G diagonal we
can take the privacy-preserving noise w to be white and Gaussian with covariance σ2Im with
σ2 = κ2δ,‖GK‖22. Since u and w are uncorrelated, we have
Pyv(z) = F (z)Pu(z)G(z
−1)T , Pv(z) = G(z)Pu(z)G(z−1)T + σ2Im. (17)
Hence
H(z) = F (z)Pu(z)G(z
−1)T
(
G(z)Pu(z)G(z
−1)T + κ2δ,‖G‖22 Im
)−1
. (18)
The MSE can then be expressed as elms(G) = 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi Tr(Py(e
jω) − Pyˆ(ejω))dω [40, Chapter
7]. In our case,
Pyˆ(e
jω) = H(ejω)Pv(e
jω)H(ejω)∗ = Pyv(ejω)Pv(ejω)−1Pyv(ejω)∗
Pyˆ = FPuG
∗(σ2Im +GPuG∗)−1GPuF ∗,
where on the second line and below we omit the argument ejω next to all matrices, to simplify
the notation. We have then
Py − Pyˆ = FPuF ∗ − Pyˆ = F (Pu − PuG∗(σ2Im +GPuG∗)−1GPu)F ∗
= F
(
P−1u +
1
σ2
G∗G
)−1
F ∗,
with the last expression obtained using the matrix inversion lemma. Finally, defining G˜(ejω) :=
1
‖GK‖2G(e
jω)K, we obtain the expression
elms(G˜) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr
F (ejω)(Pu(ejω)−1 + 1
κ2δ,
K−1G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω)K−1
)−1
F ∗(ejω))
 dω
elms(G˜) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr
[
F˜ (ejω)(P˜u(e
jω)−1 + G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω))−1F˜ (ejω)∗
]
dω, (19)
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where F˜ (ejω) = κδ,F (ejω)K and P˜u(ejω) = 1κ2δ,K
−1Pu(ejω)K−1. The objective (19) should be
minimized over all transfer functions G˜, which by definition must satisfy the constraint
‖G˜‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω))dω = 1. (20)
Note that in (19) we recover the expression (12) of the performance of the ZFE mechanism in
the limit P˜u(ejω)→∞.
It remains to minimize the performance measure (19) over the choise of pre-filters G satisfying
(20). First, in the case where P˜u(ejω) or equivalently Pu(ejω) is diagonal for all ω, i.e., the
different input signals are uncorrelated, we have in fact a classical allocation problem [41] whose
solution is of the “waterfilling type”. Namely, denote P˜u(ejω) = diag(p1(ejω), . . . , pm(ejω)) and
X(ejω) = G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω) = diag(x1(ejω), . . . , xm(ejω)), with xi(ejω) = |g˜ii(ejω)|2. Omitting the
expression ejω in the integrals for clarity, (19) and (20) read
min
x
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
1
1
pi
+ xi
|F˜i|22 dω s.t.
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
xi dω = 1, xi(e
jω) ≥ 0,∀ω, i,
and the solution to this convex problem is
xi(e
jω) = max
0,
√
|F˜i(ejω)|22
λ
− 1
pi(ejω)
 ,
where λ > 0 is adjusted so that the solution satisfies the equality constraint (20). Problems of
this type are discussed in the communication literature on joint transmitter-receiver optimization
[27], [28], which is not too surprising in view of our approximation setup on Fig. 1.
When P˜u(ejω) is not diagonal, it is shown in [28] that the problem can be reduced to the
diagonal case if G˜ can be arbitrary, however the argument does not carry through under our
constraint that G˜ must also be diagonal. Nonetheless, one can obtain a solution arbitrarily close
to the optimal one using semidefinite programming. First, we discretize the optimization problem
at the set of frequencies ωq = qpiN , q = 0 . . . N . Note that all functions are even functions of ω,
hence we can restrict out attention to the interval [0, pi]. Then, we define the m(N + 1) variables
xiq = xi(e
jωq), with xiq ≥ 0, and Xq = diag(x1q, . . . , xmq). Using the trapezoidal rule to
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approximate the integrals, we obtain the following optimization problem
min
{Xq ,Mq}0≤q≤N
1
2N
N−1∑
q=0
Tr [Mq +Mq+1] (21)
s.t.
Mq F˜q
F˜ ∗q P˜
−1
q +Xq
  0, 0 ≤ q ≤ N, (22)
1
2Npi
N−1∑
q=0
Tr[Xq +Xq+1] = 1, and Xq  0, 0 ≤ q ≤ N,
where F˜q := F˜ (ejωq) and P˜q = P˜u(ejωq). Note that (22) is equivalent to Mq  F˜q(P˜−1q +Xq)−1F˜ ∗q
by taking the Schur complement. The optimization problem (22) is a semidefinite program, and
can thus be solved efficiently even for relatively fine discretizations of the interval [0, pi]. The
transfer functions g˜ii (and hence gii) of the filter G˜ can then be obtained by interpolation of the
squared magnitude xi(ejω) from the xiq and m spectral factorizations.
Remark 2. Even if the statistical assumptions on u turn out not to be correct, and even though
the optimization problem is solved approximately rather than exactly, the differential privacy
guarantee of the LMS mechanism still holds and only the approximation quality is impacted.
2) Causal Mechanism: Once the diagonal pre-filter G is computed by the optimization pro-
cedure described above, we construct the final mechanism by replacing the smoother H from
(18) by a filter respecting the causality or delay constraints of the application. Note from (17)
that Pv(ejω)  0 for all −pi ≤ ω < pi. Denote the canonical spectral factorization Pv(z) =
L(z)PeL(z
−1)T where Pe  0 and L and L−1 are analytic in the region |z| ≥ 1 and L(∞) = Im
[40, Section 7.8]. Then the causal Wiener filter is H(z) = [Pyv(z)L(z−1)−T ]+ P−1e L(z)
−1, where
for a linear filter M(z) with (matrix-valued) impulse reponse {Mt}−∞≤t≤∞, [M(z)]+ denotes
the causal filter with impulse response {Mt1{t≥0}}t.
B. Exploiting Information on the Input Domain using Decision-Feedback Mechanisms
Signals capturing event streams often take values in a discrete set, e.g., if they originate from
various counting sensors as in Section V. This information can be taken into account together
with the previous statistical information by introducing a slight degree of nonlinearity in the
LMS mechanism, using the idea of decision-feedback equalization [39]. We call the resulting
mechanism presented below a Decision-Feedback (DF) mechanism. Its architecture is depicted
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-
+
+
+u
w
v
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H2
F
u˜ uˆ yˆ
Fig. 5. Decision-feedback mechanism. The decision block is nonlinear and depends on the information about the domain of
the input signal u, operating as a detector or quantizer for example.
on Fig. 5. Note that compared to the optimal Wiener smoother (18) in the previous section,
which is of the form FHu, the only structural difference is the presence of the decision block
and the feedback loop.
The first stage of the DF mechanism is a pre-filter whose sensitivity determines as usual the
amount of privacy-preserving noise w to add. The second stage consists of a forward filter H1,
a nonlinear decision procedure (detector or quantizer) to estimate u from u˜, which exploits the
fact that u takes discrete values, and a filter H2 that feeds back the previous symbol decisions
to correct the intermediate estimate u˜. H2 is assumed to be strictly causal, but H1 is often taken
to be at least slightly non-causal in standard DF equalizers, for better performance [42]. In this
case the mechanism will introduce a small delay in the publication of the output signal yˆ. In the
absence of detailed information about the distribution of u, the decision device can be a simple
quantizer for integer valued input sequences, or a detector uˆk = sign(u˜k) for input sequences
taking values in {−1,+1}.
The error between the desired output Fu and the signal Fu˜, where u˜ is the input of the
detector, is e = F (u− u˜) = F (u−H1v+H2uˆ). For tractability reasons, the analysis and design
of DF equalizers is usually carried out under the simplifying assumption that the past decisions
entering H2 are correct, i.e., that uˆk = uk. In this case, the error reads
e ≈ F ((B −H1G)u−H1w),
with B(z) = I +H2(z) a monic filter (i.e., B0 = I) since H2 is strictly causal. For a given B,
the system H1 minimizing the MSE is again the Wiener smoother to estimate Bu from Gu+w,
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i.e., comparing with (18), (19)
H1(z) = B(z)Pu(z)G(z
−1)T
(
G(z)Pu(z)G(z
−1)T + κ2δ,‖G‖22 Im
)−1
,
edf (B, G˜) =
κ2δ,
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr
[
F (ejω)B(ejω)K(P˜u(e
jω)−1 + G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω))−1KB(ejω)∗F (ejω)∗
]
dω.
The next step is to optimize over the monic filter B. First, consider the spectral factorizations
K(P˜u(e
jω)−1 + G˜(ejω)∗G˜(ejω))−1K = Q(ejω)RQ(ejω)∗ (23)
F (ejω)∗F (ejω) = S(ejω)∗TS(ejω), (24)
with Q,S monic, causal, stable and invertible filters, and R, T positive definite matrices. We
have
edf (B, G˜) =
κ2δ,
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr
[
B(ejω)Q(ejω)RQ(ejω)∗B(ejω)∗S(ejω)∗TS(ejω)
]
dω
=
κ2δ,
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr
[
T 1/2S(ejω)B(ejω)Q(ejω)RQ(ejω)∗B(ejω)∗S(ejω)∗T 1/2
]
dω
= κ2δ,‖T 1/2SBQR1/2‖22.
Note that SBQ is a monic, stable and causal filter. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If G(z) =
∑
k≥0Gkz
−k be a monic (G0 = I), stable and causal filter. Let T , R be
positive definite Hermitian matrices. Then
‖T 1/2GR1/2‖22 ≥ Tr(TR),
with equality attained when G = Id, i.e., Gk = 0 for k ≥ 1.
Proof: We have
‖T 1/2GR1/2‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
pi
Tr
[
T 1/2G(ejω)RG∗(ejω)T 1/2
]
dω
= Tr
(∑
k≥0
T 1/2GkRG
∗
kT
1/2
)
(Parceval identity)
= Tr(TR) + Tr
(∑
k>0
T 1/2GkRG
∗
kT
1/2
)
≥ Tr(TR),
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since the terms in the last sum are positive semi-definite matrices. Clearly equality is attained
for Gk = 0 for k ≥ 1.
From Lemma 1 we deduce immediately that we should choose
B(z) = S−1(z)Q−1(z)
and the corresponding MSE is edf (G˜) = κ2δ, Tr(TR), with the positive definite matrices T,R
defined in (23), (24).
The final step would be to optimize the filter G to minimize this expression of edf . Although
this can be done using an approach similar to the one of the Section VI-A, see [1], [43], it
appears that this procedure in general results in a pre-filter G that does not depend on the query
F , which could be an artifact of the initial assumption that past decisions are correct. This can be
seen most easily in the single-input case where T,R are positive scalars, so that edf (G˜) = TR. In
this product F influences only in the factor T and G only in the factor R, hence the minimization
over G does not depend on F . Optimizing G independently of F appears to lead to suboptimal
designs in general, see [1].
Hence, we propose the following design strategy for DF mechanisms. Note from (18) that
the (non-causal) LMS mechanism involves a Wiener smoother H(z) = F (z)Hu(z), with Hu the
Linear Minimum Mean Squared Error estimator for u. We can interpret the DF mechanism on
Fig. 5 as introducing an additional (nonlinear) stage to the LMS mechanisms to discretize the
estimate of u, and replacing Hu by H1. A (potentially suboptimal) strategy to improve on the
performance of the LMS (or ZFE) mechanism is then to keep the same prefilter G designed
in Section VI-A, but simply replace the Wiener smoother or filter by the decision-feedback
equalizer as described above, with a causal or almost causal approximation of the filter H1. Our
simulation results tend to confirm that good performance is achievable with this strategy.
Remark 1. Other DF mechanisms are possible. For example, H1 could be chosen as a zero-
forcing (H1 = G−1 in the SISO case) rather than a mean square equalizer, see, e.g., [44].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have described a two-stage optimization procedure that can be used in the filtering of event
streams in order to minimize the impact on performance of a differential privacy specification.
The architecture considered here for the privacy-preserving mechanisms decomposes into a
July 18, 2018 DRAFT
28
standard equalization or estimation problem, for which many alternatives techniques could be
used depending on the scenario, and a first-stage privacy-preserving filter optimization problem.
This two-stage design allows us to balance the privacy constraint and performance, and appears
to be in fact quite general and even applicable to other definitions of privacy. Current work
includes extending it to the design of differentially private nonlinear filters [45].
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